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The court of appeals held that the fact that the prosecuting assistant district attorney was not a licensed attorney did not result
in any deprivation of the defendants' constitutional due process
rights. 30 1 The court stated that the defendants had not cited any
authority, nor was the court aware of any, which stood for the
proposition "that a defendant has a due process right to be prosecuted by a duly admitted attorney.", 302 Further, the court noted
that defendants cited cases which dealt with a defendant's sixth
amendment right to be "represented by a lawyer - not
prosecuted by a lawyer." ' 303
Judge Titone, joined by Judge Alexander, dissented, but did
not address the constitutional claim raised by defendants. Rather,
the dissent was based on the fact that the assistant district
attorney, who was an unlicensed attorney, appeared before the
grand jury in violation of New York Criminal Procedure Law
section 190.25(3), which prohibits unauthorized persons from
304
appearing before the grand jury.
305
Savastano v. Nurnberg

(decided December 27, 1990)

Plaintiffs, three involuntarily committed mentally il patients,
alleged that section 29.11 of the Mental Hygiene Law (MIL) 306
and title 14, section 517.4, of the New York Code of Rules and
Regulations (NYCRR) 30 7 violated their procedural due process
rights under the federal 308 and state 309 constitutions. These
sections authorized transfer of plaintiffs' from a municipal acute
care facility to an intermediate or long term state mental health
301. Id. at 107, 566 N.E.2d at 124, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
302. Id. at 106, 566 N.E.2d at 124, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 997.
303. Id. at 107, 566 N.E.2d at 124, 564 N.Y.S.2d at 997 (footnote
omitted) (emphasis in original).
304. Id. at 107-12, 566 N.E.2d at 124-28; 564 N.Y.S.2d at 997-1001
(Titone, I., dissenting).
305. 77 N.Y.2d 300, 569 N.E.2d 421, 567 N.Y.S.2d 618 (1990).
306. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 29.11 (McKinney 1988).
307. N.Y. COMP. CODEs R. & REos. tit. 14, § 517.4 (1990).
308. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
309. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
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institution without a prior formal judicial hearing. The court
rejected plaintiffs' arguments that the due process safeguards
provided within these sections were insufficient, and that a "fullscale judicial hearing" was required before a transfer could take
0
place. 31
The MHL and the NYCRR provide a procedural framework to
be followed before "an objecting patient may be transferred from
a municipal psychiatric facility to a State institution." 3 11 For example, the patient is given the opportunity to appeal the transfer
to the clinical director of the transferring facility. This appeal
may be informal "without adherence to the rules of evidence and
record keeping .... "312 The receiving hospital is also given the
opportunity to examine the patient to determine whether the
transfer is in the patient's best interest. Additionally, if the patient is dissatisfied with a determination to transfer, the patient
may initiate another judicial proceeding and seek injunctive relief.3 13
In rejecting plaintiffs' arguments, the court of appeals based its
due process analysis upon the balancing test enunciated in
Mathews v. Eldridge.314 The court chose not to conduct a
separate analysis under the state constitution, therefore, rendering
the state rule in this case identical to the federal rule.
Mathews articulated three factors to be considered when addressing a procedural due process question:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
310. Savastano, 77 N.Y.2d at 307, 569 N.E.2d at 424, 567 N.Y.S.2d at
621.

311. Id. at 306, 569 N.E.2d at 423, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 620.
312. Id. (quoting N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & Raos. tit. 14, § 517.4(c)(3)(i)
(1990)).
313. Id. 77 N.Y.2d at 307, 569 N.E.2d at 423-24, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 62021.
314. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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substitute procedural requirements would entail.

In applying this three part test, the New York Court of Appeals
acknowledged that the patient's interest in the outcome of the
hearing is substantial. However, the court concluded that a "fullscale" judicial hearing, requiring adherence to rules of evidence
and cross examination, would be of little value. 3 16 In arriving at
its conclusion, the court noted that the determination of whether a
3 17
transfer is in a patient's best interest is a medical judgment.

The court of appeals, quoting Parham v. J.R.,318 reasoned that
"'shifting the decision from a trained specialist using the traditional tools of medical science to an untrained judge or administrative hearing officer after a judicial-type hearing"' 3 19 would
not "decrease the risk of erroneous deprivation.,, 320
Finally, the court acknowledged that financial resources are
presently scarce and requiring such judicial hearings would further strain the state's fiscal burden without providing much benefit. Therefore, the court held that section 29.11 of the MI., and
title 14, section 517.4, of the NYCRR did not deprive plaintiffs
321
of their federal or state constitutional due process rights.
On the federal level, in Rennie v. Klein322 the court held that
when providing a hearing for a mentally ill patient to determine
whether medication should be forcibly administered, it is consti-

315. Id. at 335 (citation omitted). Before the Mathews factors are
considered in determining what process is due, a liberty interest must first be
implicated. Accordingly, Judge Bellacosa, in the Savastano concurrence,
would not even apply Mathews because he believed that "no constitutionally
cognizable liberty interest is implicated by the statutory and regulatory scheme
at issue." Savastano, 77 N.Y.2d at 310, 569 N.E.2d at 426, 567 N.Y.S.2d at
623 (Bellacosa, J., concurring).
316. Savastano, 77 N.Y.2d at 308-09, 569 N.E.2d at 424-25, 567
N.Y.S.2d at 621-22.
317. Id. at 308, 569 N.E.2d at 424, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 621 (citing N.Y.
COMP. CODES R. & REGs. tit. 14, § 517.4(d)(1) (1990)).
318. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
319. Savastano, 77 N.Y.2d at 308, 569 N.E.2d at 424-25, 567 N.Y.S.2d at
621-22 (quoting Parham,442 U.S. at 312).
320. Id. at 309, 569 N.E.2d at 425, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
321. Id. at 310, 569 N.E.2d at 425, 567 N.Y.S.2d at 622.
322. 476 F. Supp. 1294 (D.NJ. 1979).
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tutionally adequate for a psychiatrist to preside at the proceeding. 32 3 The court held that a full blown hearing presided over by
a judge, with adherence to rules of evidence, is not needed to
meet federal due process standards. 324 Therefore, the patient's
federal due process rights will be met whether a judge, an
administrative hearing officer, or a psychiatrist acts as the
independent decision-maker. On the other hand, the court held
that a patient's due process rights are violated if the medical
director of a facility presides at the hearing. The court reasoned
that a medical director is subject to institutional pressures and
cannot remove himself completely from the demands of the
hospital staff. "[I]nstitutional pressures -- similar to the pressures
that have created the unfortunate legacy of overdrugging in state
mental hospitals -- make it impossible for anyone in the medical
director's position to have sufficient independence, much less the
appearance of fairness which due process requires." 325
More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that title 14, sections 27.8 and 27.9 of the
NYCRR, which articulate procedures to determine whether an
involuntarily committed mentally ill patient can be forcibly
medicated, satisfied federal due process standards despite the fact
that the statute does not require formal judicial hearings. 32 6
323. Id. at 1310.
324. Id. New York State, however, does require a judicial hearing to
determine whether a patient may be medicated over his or her objection. See
Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 497, 495 N.E.2d 337, 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74,
81 (1986). In Rivers, the court of appeals held that a judicial determination
must be made concerning whether an involuntarily committed mentally ill
patient has the capacity to make a reasoned decision regarding treatment after
the administrative review provided by title 14, section 27.8 of the NYCRR has
been exhausted. Id. (emphasis added). This is because such administrative
review does not meet state constitutional due process rights. Id.
325. Rennie, 476 F. Supp at 1310.
326. See Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960 (2d Cir. 1983); but see
Rivers v. Katz, 67 N.Y.2d 485, 498, 495 N.E.2d 337, 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d 74,
81 (1986) ("The administrative review procedures of title 14, section 27.8, of
the NYCRR 27.8 do not sufficiently protect the due process rights of
involuntarily committed patients guaranteed by article I, section 6 of the New
York State Constitution."). The Rivers court concluded that the administrative
procedures provided by title 14, section 27.8 of the NYCRR lacked standards
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Therefore, hearings other than the formal judicial type have been
held not to violate due process in the area of involuntary civil
commitment.
Likewise, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit has held that commitment proceedings for mentally retarded adults need not be judicial in nature. 327 The court stated
that:
Although, as a matter of policy, precommitment review by a
judicial officer would ensure the most vigorous protection of the
mentally retarded, and thus, might be preferable, it has been
noted in a variety of situations that due process does not require
that the neutral trier of fact be legally trained or a judicial or
32 8
administrative officer.
The majority wrote that although the decision to commit a person is a medical decision, due process requirements must be met.
However, the court concluded that a non-judicial hearing would
satisfy the requirements of due process.
These decisions indicate that although an independent decisionmaker is needed to meet state and federal constitutional due process standards, a full blown judicial hearing is not always necessary on either the state or federal level. Due process requirements
may be met when an involuntarily committed mentally ill patient
is provided with an opportunity for an informal hearing presided
over by an independent decision-maker when the hearing concerns a transfer of a patient between institutions, 329 or in forced
medication proceedings. 330

to guide the decision maker throughout the administrative process. In fact, title
14, section 27.8 of the NYCRR provides no standards to measure the need for
treatment, the degree of intrusiveness of a particular drug, or the duration of
its use. Rivers, 67 N.Y.2d at 498, 495 N.E.2d at 344, 504 N.Y.S.2d at 81.
327. See Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386 (6th Cir. 1988).
328. Id. at 1393 (citations omitted).
329. See Savastano v. Numberg, 77 N.Y.2d 300, 569 N.E.2d 421, 567
N.Y.S.2d 618 (1990).
330. See Rennie v. Klein, 476 F. Supp 1294 (D.N.J. 1979).
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SECOND DEPARTMENT

Long Island Lighting Co. v. Assessor of Brookhaven 33 1
(decided March 2, 1990)

See the discussion of this case under EQUAL PROTECTION. 332 The court held that the statute violated Long Island
Lighting Co.'s (LILCO) substantive state and federal due process
rights because the statute arbitrarily restricted LILCO's right to
judicial review. 333
THIRD DEPARTMENT

Sisario v. Amsterdam Memorial Hospital 334
(decided March 22, 1990)

See the discussion of this case analysis under EQUAL
PROTECTION. 335 The court denied plaintiff's claim that CPLR
3012-a violated state and federal due process rights by restricting
access to the courts. The court recognized the state's right to
condition access to the courts unless a right has been "recognized
as [being] entitled to special protection." 336 The court held that
there was a rational relationship between the restrictions imposed
and the objective of the statute and, therefore, no denial of
plaintiff's procedural due process rights.

331. 154 A.D.2d 188, 552 N.Y.S.2d 336 (2d Dep't 1990).

332. See infra notes 553-66 and accompanying text.
333. Long Island Lighting Co., 154 A.D.2d at 195-96, 552 N.Y.S.2d at
341.
334. 159 A.D.2d 843, 552 N.Y.S.2d 989 (3d Dep't), appeal dismissed, 76
N.Y.2d 844, 559 N.E.2d 1287, 560 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1990).
335. See infra notes 533-66 and accompanying text.

336. Sisario, 159 A.D.2d at 845, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
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